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Social Knowledge
Keith Jensen, Joan B. Silk, Kristin Andrews, Redouan Bshary,
Dorothy L. Cheney, Nathan Emery, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk,
Kay Holekamp, Derek C. Penn, Josef Perner, and
Christoph Teufel

Abstract
The social milieus of animals can be complex, ranging from almost completely asocial
to monogamous pairs (no mean feat) to entire societies. To adapt to a constantly shifting environment of individuals striving toward their own goals, animals appear to have
evolved specialized cognitive abilities. As appealing and intuitive as the idea of social
cognition is, just defining it is difficult. We attempted to delineate social cognition,
speculate on its adaptive value, and come to an understanding of what we mean when
we talk about complexity. Transitive inference was often brought up as an example of
a cognitive ability that is important for social animals, though the focus of much of the
discussion was on theory of mind. For some, theory of mind is something of a Holy
Grail, whereas for others, it is more of a McGuffin. There are a number of challenges
and debates in trying to determine what cognitive abilities different animals use to solve
their social problems. This chapter discusses methodological approaches and issues that
are needed to propel the future of research into social knowledge.

Social Cognition: What Is It, and What Is It Good For?
What Is Social Cognition?
Simply put, social cognition comprises cognitive processes that are applied
to social behavior. That may sound trivially obvious; however, there are some
tricky waters to be navigated in this thimble-sized definition.
What is social and what is cognition? One important issue concerns the
question of whether social cognition is, indeed, special and distinct from, say,
physical cognition. Examples of behaviors and capacities that are examined
under the rubric of social cognition include individual recognition, social partner preferences, development and maintenance of relationships (e.g., reconciliation and alliances), triadic relationships (including transitive inference),
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morality, social preferences, theory of mind, contingent social coordination,
collaboration, cooperation, social executive function, synchrony in time and
space, social learning (e.g., imitation), gaze following, social manipulation,
deception, predicting behavior, teaching, imitation, and punishment. The challenge is to determine which cognitive processes underlie these different behaviors, as well as to analyze how different species might use different processes
to achieve the same outcomes.
Behaviors are observable phenomena. We can infer from these phenomena
their function, namely their adaptive value, and their underlying structure, specifically their mental processes (cognitions) and the mechanisms which underlie these (such as neurological structures and hormones, as well as associative
learning mechanisms). While behavioral ecologists tend to be interested in the
functions of behaviors, comparative psychologists focus more on the processes. These divergent interests are both highly informative in explaining why an
animal does what it does, though disagreements do arise, in part, because specialists in these fields often talk solely about the function or the process without agreeing that they might be talking about the same phenomena. Using the
same terms for these different levels of explanation (ultimate and proximate,
respectively) does little to reduce the confusion, a point emphasized in our discussion of folk psychology. For cognition researchers, the functional approach
to understanding behavior is very important since cognitive processes should,
or at least can, be tailored to specific adaptive problems.
Social Cognition as Distinct from Physical Cognition
In theory, at least, social cognition is different from physical cognition because
it addresses problems linked to interactions with other agents, whereas physical cognition deals with problems linked to a relatively passive environment.
Typically, the physical environment does not change rapidly, from moment to
moment, as the social environment can, and thus it is more predictable: a solution which works today will likely work as well tomorrow. For example, the
physics of tool use are constant, and landmarks used for orientation typically
persist over long time periods. In a social environment, however, individuals
pursue their own goals, and things such as rank orders and quality of relationships are subject to change. This often leads to the situation where the optimal
behavior of an individual depends on how its partner(s) behaves. A partner’s
behavior may be variable because many behaviors are condition dependent
(e.g., hungry animals behave differently from satiated ones, reproductively active animals differently from non-reproducing ones).
In terms of sociality, game theory provides a partial answer to why social
cognition might be different from physical cognition. Game theory is a formal
system in both behavior ecology and economics concerned with interactions
between individuals and their choices. Optimality (or choice) theory provides
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another modeling approach. The key difference between the two, as used in
behavioral ecology (Krebs and Davies 1993), is that the optimality approach
assumes that the environment is passive. Under this assumption, one best solution emerges and all animals should behave in the same way. For example, animals should only eat high quality food and ignore food of lower quality as long
as the density of high quality food is above a threshold. Below that threshold,
animals should eat anything they find. In the game theoretical approach, the
environment is not passive but consists of other agents with their own goals.
Therefore, the best behavioral strategy to adopt during an interaction often
depends on what others are doing. Whether animals treat game theoretical and
optimality problems differently is an open question.
Adaptive Value of Social Cognition
A behavior that is specialized in one domain may be used in another domain,
making it difficult to determine whether a given ability involves physical or
social cognition (or some of both). Memory, for instance, is domain general, but memory for faces may build on this due to selection pressures for a
specialized trait. Adaptive social behavior would come about from selective
pressures in the social domain, distinct from generalized cognitive abilities or
those adapted to nonsocial problems, such as foraging. (Whether predator-prey
interactions count as “social” is something that is rarely considered; the emphasis is usually on conspecifics, though this need not be the case, as in, e.g.,
interspecific mutualisms.) Social problems include predicting the behaviors
of others (animate beings), possibly manipulating them or coordinating with
them, or recognizing relationships among individuals. To determine whether
a given trait is specialized for the social domain, and hence is underpinned by
specialized cognitive abilities, it helps to consider the trait’s adaptive function.
For behaviors such as navigation, it is clear that the cognitive processes which
lead to the animal getting home, for instance, are adaptive. Researchers can
then manipulate components of that process and measure whether the animal
achieves its goal, or not, and how it does so.
For social behavior, this can be more difficult. Consider transitive inference,
inferring relationships among items. The ability to infer from one’s belief that
“4 is greater than 2” and “2 is greater than 1” to the belief that “4 is greater
than 1” is an ability that cuts across domains, but it might be selected for in
the social realm. An animal that lives in a social group may not only have
some knowledge of its own relationship to other individuals in the group, say
whether it is dominant to D and E and subordinate to A and B, but it may also
recognize the relationships among others in the group (e.g., that B is also subordinate to A and dominant to D). Although the adaptive value of a particular
cognitive ability often seems to be intuitively obvious, this is usually very
difficult to demonstrate empirically. We can hypothesize, for example, that
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transitive inference allows animals to recognize other individuals’ dominance
ranks, recruit alliance partners, and assess potential rivals’ fighting abilities,
but it is almost impossible to assign a fitness value to these behaviors or to
demonstrate any individual variation in this ability that might be related to
reproductive success.
A related problem arises when we attempt to identify the mechanisms underlying a particular cognitive ability. Again, consider transitive inference.
There are several ways by which an animal could infer that B > D in a sequence
in which A > B > C > D > E, etc. One way is through associative strength; that
is, B is valued higher than C because of its association with A, and C is valued
higher than D because of its association with B. This indirect acquisition of
associative strength, or “value transfer” (von Fersen et al. 1991; Shettleworth
2010b), predicts that error rates will be higher at the end of a sequence than at
the beginning, such that the discriminations B/C or B/D will be more accurate
than C/D or C/E. Error rates will also increase significantly if a new item appears in the sequence. By contrast, an animal that has a linear representation of
the entire sequence recognizes an item’s ordinal position in the list. Transitive
inference through list representation is thought to be more cognitively complex
than inference through associative strength. It should be equally accurate at
the end of a list as at the beginning, and it should be relatively insensitive to
omissions and substitutions (Bond et al. 2003; Shettleworth 2010b). A number
of tests conducted on captive animals have suggested that pigeons (Columba
livia) make transitive inferences based on associative strength, whereas monkeys represent ordinal sequences (reviewed by Shettleworth 2010b).
An example of the difficulty involved in determining the cognitive mechanisms subsuming transitive inference comes from a comparative study of
western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) and pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus
cyanocephalus). Western scrub jays are semi-territorial corvids, living in
small family groups in some areas and conditions and territorial pairs in others. By contrast, closely related pinyon jays live in large, highly structured
social groups with many individual members. Bond et al. (2003) compared
transitive inference in these two bird species and hypothesized that, as a result
of selection pressure favoring the ability to recognize other group members’
relative dominance ranks, pinyon jays would be more accurate than scrub
jays. Furthermore, pinyon jays would represent the sequence as an ordinal list,
whereas scrub jays would rely on associative strength. Results provided mixed
support for these predictions. Pinyon jays learned the sequences more rapidly
and more accurately than scrub jays, and they showed no early-order effects.
However, scrub jays also learned to rank items in the sequence, though more
slowly and less accurately than pinyon jays. Results such as these highlight
both the value of comparative studies and their limitations. If two species can
achieve almost similar results through different means, of what benefit is it to
adopt the apparently more difficult method?
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Is Social Cognition Complex?
Presumably, the more complex the problem to be solved, the more sophisticated the cognitive mechanism needed, although even this intuitive claim
cannot be taken for granted since simple mechanisms can sometimes do the
trick (Shettleworth 2010a). As a result, again presumably, a relatively larger
and more energetically expensive brain is needed to solve more complex problems. Complexity is a scale of variability in the environment, and at least three
dimensions of complexity are relevant to this issue. One aspect of complexity
is the possible number of variations in the environment or states of the world.
If the only possible states of the world are night and day, little variation exists,
and the world is not very complex. However, increasing the number of possible
states of the world increases the complexity of the environment. Possible states
of the world give a maximum amount of variation in the environment. Patterns
in these states may, however, exist and the predictability of the patterns may
reduce complexity in the environment. For example, if an individual always
attacks after giving a particular threat signal, the predictability of the situation
reduces its complexity. If, however, following a threat, an animal sometimes
attacks and sometimes bluffs, the situation becomes more complex. Finally,
strategic elements of the environment influence its complexity. If aspects of
the environment depend on an individual’s behavior, this increases complexity
because the states of the world are not fixed but respond to an individual’s behavior. This dependency is captured by the notion of a strategic game in game
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Maynard Smith 1982). Thus,
when dependency exists, the world is a moving target depending on one’s own
behavior, thereby increasing the complexity of the environment.
Complexity is not just an objective, external aspect of the environment. In
this sense, it can be quantified by an outside observer. Animals, however, do
not necessarily have to track or respond to all of this environmental complexity.
We may think of more subjective approaches to measure the complexity of the
environment. Wildebeest (Connochaetes sp.) herds can number into the tens
of thousands, but no individual uses social information on all other individuals
in the group. Though the complexity exists objectively in the environment, it
is not effectively relevant to the organism. Thus, it is important to make conceptual distinctions between objective and subjective aspects of complexity in
the environment. For instance, the fact that a pair-bond in birds only involves
two parties (when they are not “eavesdropping” on other pairs) does not necessarily mean that the complexity of the relationship is reduced compared to
relationships among multiple parties in a larger social group. Indeed, there is
good reason to think that individuals who form strong bonds process social
information in a very complex manner, particularly when reasoning about others’ mental states. By contrast, individuals in larger groups which do not form
strong bonds process social information at a low level of complexity because
they do not know or need to know as much information about other parties
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where relationships are not as “valuable” (van Schaik and Aureli 2000). As
yet, we do not have very good measures or tests for social complexity which
do not rely on assumptions about the underlying cognitive abilities required
when living in a pair versus a larger group. The measures or tests will need to
accommodate many different forms of sociality (social system, mating system)
if they are going to prove useful tools for comparative analyses.
Complexity and the Brain
If more complex environments require more complex cognitive abilities, one
would expect the brain to reflect this increase in complexity. This has been
called the social intelligence hypothesis (Dunbar 1992, 1998a).1 The suggestion is that processing nonsocial information, such as the location, state and
type of food, does not depend on the same structure (or complexity) of cognitive abilities as social information does (though see the technical intelligence
hypothesis; Byrne and Whiten 1997). A number of analyses found that there
was a strong relationship between the relative size of the neocortex and mean
group size, but not with other ecological variables, such as home range size or
the amount of fruit in the diet (Dunbar 1992). In primates and carnivores, the
relationship is not wholly uncontroversial, as no data were presented on the
relatively solitary orangutans in the original analysis, and primates living in
the largest social groups, such as baboons (Papio sp.) and macaques (Macaca
sp.), do not necessarily have the largest neocortices. The relationship between
social complexity and brain size varies among the extant families of mammals,
with some families failing altogether to conform to predictions of the social
brain hypothesis, but others conforming very well (Finarelli and Flynn 2009).
Recent analyses have further confused the issue because pair-bonding also
correlates with brain size in many mammals (ungulates, bats, and primates;
Dunbar and Shultz 2007). Many bird species display very complex forms of
social behavior, but would be predicted to demonstrate poor correlations between brain size and flock size using similar analyses performed with primates
(Emery 2006). In birds, there is a strong relationship between the size of the
forebrain (the best neuroanatomical data available from one source) and pairbonding (Emery et al. 2007; Shultz and Dunbar 2010).
The main problem with the social brain hypothesis is what the two variables
in the analysis actually represent. Mean group size was originally chosen as
a proxy measure of social complexity or level of social information processing. For example, a species that lives in a pair (n = 2) is more limited by the
number of potential relationships (n = 1) than is a species that lives in a larger
social group (say, 5 individuals) because the number of potential relationships
1

Emery and colleagues propose to apply the social brain hypothesis to prosocial behavior and
the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis to the more strategic (i.e., deceptive) aspects of social behavior.
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in the larger group (n = 10) is greater than in the dyad. The natural assumption is that the greater the amount of information that can be processed in a
larger group (e.g., tracking of previous relationships, dominance hierarchies,
reciprocity), the larger the processor that is required, as reflected by a larger
brain (or neocortex).
There is evidence that this relationship between brain size and social group
size does not hold. Analysis of the vocal recognition of chacma baboons
(Papio ursinus) and closely related geladas (Theropithecus gelada) found that
the geladas, which live in larger social groups, did not recognize all the individuals they encounter based on their vocalizations, whereas the baboons did
(Bergman 2010). This suggests that there is “missing social knowledge” in
geladas, such that not all potential relationships between group members are
treated equally. Thus, using mean group size as a proxy for social complexity may not be appropriate for all species. There are also intriguing data from
social insects which show that, even with their very small brains (and total
lack of neocortex), they can remember specific individuals and the context in
which they were remembered (i.e., tracking relationships) for very long periods (Sheehan and Tibbetts 2008).
In addition, it is assumed that the brain area chosen as a variable is important to social information processing. Usually, large areas of the brain (either
the forebrain or neocortex) process much more than simply social information.
The neural circuitry of social behavior is being investigated in various species,
including primates, to a fine level of detail, but the comparative neuroanatomical data sets have yet to catch up with current knowledge, so the same old data
sets are still being used (e.g., Stephan et al. 1981). As such, there are significant
issues about the quality of the neural material being used in such analyses,
especially if pooled across different data sets that used different methods to
prepare the material and so may not present a true representation of the actual
size of the brain region under study (discussed in Healy and Rowe 2007).

Why Is Theory of Mind So Sexy (and Has It
Screwed up Comparative Psychology)?
Transitive inference has been discussed in the context of social complexity,
with the assumption that more complex social environments will demand more
complex abilities at tracking social relationships. Complex cognitive abilities do not only mean being able to track larger numbers of individuals and
their relationships; knowledge of what just one other individual knows, desires, and believes is considered to be cognitively advanced, and possibly even
unique to humans. The topic of “mind reading” has captivated comparative
psychologists who have attempted to find this ability in other animals, but it
may be that this pursuit of a cognitive “Holy Grail” may be counterproductive.
Ironically, perhaps, this topic generated more discussion than any other. Below
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we consider the question of why theory of mind is such a provocative research
issue, the evidence for and against it, and what can be done about it. We also
consider whether animals can recognize something of the emotions of others.
First, however, a foray into folk psychology is needed to set the stage (for more
on this topic, see Penn, this volume).
Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is most generally defined as “our commonsense conception
of psychological phenomena” (Churchland 1981:67). Minimally, folk psychology consists of “a set of attributive, explanatory, and predictive practices, and
a set of notions or concepts used in these practices” (Von Eckardt 1994:300).
The practices of folk psychology would include things such as predicting, explaining, justifying, evaluating, and coordinating behavior. Concepts of folk
psychology include theoretical mental entities such as beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, sensations, goals, and personality traits. These causal roles
and patterns of behavior are agnostic on the question of mechanism, though it
is generally assumed that the same kinds of behaviors can be implemented in
very different ways, both at an algorithmic and physical level (Bickle 2008).
The use of folk psychology in animal cognition research is undeniable, but
concerns arise when folk psychological terms are used that have greater connotations or causal implications than appropriate. For example, when the term
“punishment” is used to describe an act of antagonism toward a rule-breaker,
it may be an overattribution if this connotes a particular attitude toward the
transgressor (such as a desire for rehabilitating the transgressor) rather than
just retribution. Just as there are folk psychologies for humans across cultures
(see Lillard 1998), there may be folk psychologies across species, and to do
comparative psychology, it could be productive to look at both differences and
similarities across species at the folk psychological level.
However, folk psychology can, and often is, taken as an end point, rather
than a starting point. For instance, when saying that a baboon is reconciling
with another baboon, can we state that “she is reestablishing cordial relationships”? Flowers will deceive insects, but not in the same sense in which people
will deceive each other. Is it possible to avoid the cognitive and normative baggage attached to these words? The problem of shared vocabulary continues to
vex evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and economists who use the same
lay terms, such as altruism, but in subtly different ways. A philosopher would
argue that the baboon example is a misuse of the term “reconcile” and that
despite this, according to the folk psychological view, the term should still be
used by comparative psychologists, though carefully. Folk psychology is the
linguistic equivalent of giving guns to children and telling them to play carefully: misuse is inevitable. This is especially true for words in the lay vocabulary that have a rich connotation. For example, the use of the term “rape” by
behavioral ecologists has been lambasted. Is “friendship” better? What about
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“love”? New words can be invented for the sake of precision, just as “moron”
was a term invented in 1910 to refer to people assessed with an IQ of 51–70.
Once the word escaped into the open, however, it took on unintended connotations. Thus, even words invented specifically to avoid the pitfalls of folk psychology can be misused. Overfamiliarity with terms can lead to inappropriate
inferential leaps, and this is as true for human psychology as comparative psychology. Although it may be useful to start with folk psychological intuitions
in understanding behavior, we need to determine whether these terms are warranted in each case. As stated earlier, those intuitions must be merely starting
points and open to revision during scientific investigation.
A solution to the “other minds” problem, discussed next, is not to eliminate
folk psychology altogether. A possible way forward is to decide how and when
the vocabulary and intuitions of commonsense psychology should be best
used. For example, the use of intentional predicates (e.g., attributing mental
states and representations to nonhuman animals) might be useful to comparative cognitive science. Whether any particular term (e.g., “rape,” “friendship,”
“reconciliation,” “belief,” “intention”) can be appropriately applied to animals,
however, is an empirical matter that must be decided on a case-by-case basis
(e.g., see Silk 2002).
Theory of Mind Defined, Narrowly and Broadly
Folk psychology is hardly the only cause of confusion and misunderstanding in comparative social cognition. Research on nonhuman social cognition
has been plagued by multiple and inconsistent definitions of the term theory
of mind. Penn (this volume) suggests that theory of mind research has been
particularly susceptible to the limits of folk psychology. Psychologists have
long known that commonsense views are not particularly trustworthy when
it comes to our own species’ cognition; they are even less so, Penn argues,
when it comes to the minds of other species. Premack and Woodruff (1978)
originally coined the term “theory of mind” to refer to a human’s ability to
impute mental states (e.g., goals, intentions, beliefs, and doubts) to others and
to use these unobservable entities to predict and explain their own and others’
behavior. According to Premack and Woodruff, this cognitive system properly
counts as a “theory” in humans because “such [mental] states are not directly
observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others” (Premack and Woodruff 1978:515). To illustrate their point,
Premack and Woodruff cited the use of propositional descriptions of the form,
“Paul knows that I don’t like roses.”
In the narrow sense, theory of mind is the attribution of propositional attitudes to predict and explain behavior. A propositional attitude is an attribution of an intentional state (e.g., belief, desire, hope, want, fear) that takes a
proposition as its content (e.g., “that snow is white” or “that there is ripe fruit
in the tree”). An example of a propositional attitude, then, would be: “Gojelek
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hopes that there is ripe fruit in the tree.” Understood narrowly in this way,
theory of mind has been of primary interest in the developmental literature,
where the focus has been on discovering when children are first able to attribute false belief. The motivation behind the move to understand theory of
mind (narrowly defined) as the ability to attribute false belief stemmed from
the idea that to determine whether an animal knows that others have beliefs,
experimenters could present it with a problem where it would have to alter
its own behavior in expectation of another’s behavior (Bennett 1978; Dennett
1978; Harman 1978). Predicting that another will act the same way you do
is relatively simple, but making predictions of her behavior when she would
act differently from you is more of a challenge, because it requires that you
infer the existence of someone else’s beliefs, something that cannot be directly
observed. However, this may not always be the case. A scholar in his office
would have no difficulty understanding and predicting that a baker will get
up at 3 o’clock in the morning to prepare the dough, though he would have
a harder time explaining why the baker appears at work at 9 a.m. like the
professor. Similarly, a young chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) would have little
difficulty understanding why a dominant will chase away a subordinate approaching his food source and not run away, like the young chimp would, when
the subordinate approaches. Generally, though, different behavior in the same
environment cannot be predicted via behavioral rules, because there would be
no difference in the observable stimulus. The difference in the two cases must
be conceptual, rather than environmental.
Theory of mind can also be broadly construed to refer to the ability to attribute mental states more generally to engage in social behaviors, like predicting
and explaining, and indeed, Premack claims that this is what he and Woodruff
originally meant when they introduced the term (Premack and Premack 2003).
In this sense, a theory of mind involves the attribution of a mental state—an
unobservable theoretical entity that is posited by a folk psychological theory.
Examples of theoretical entities are beliefs and desires, but also include emotions, perceptions, sensations, sentiments, etc. Recent research has focused
on this more general question about whether conceptual (i.e., nonobservable
or theoretical) mediation occurs in social cognition. Comparative cognition
research into mental state understanding centers primarily around theory of
mind understood broadly, including the attribution of knowledge states, goals,
intentions, perceptual states, and false belief. Although some claim that there
is evidence of other animals’ (or, at least, chimpanzees’) ability to attribute
knowledge, goals, intentions, and perceptual states, there is no experimental
evidence to suggest that chimpanzees (or any other animal, for that matter)
understand false belief (Call and Tomasello 2008). However, a broad use of
the term sheds little light on the important social-cognitive differences between species and obfuscates the very reason why theory of mind was initially
such an interesting and distinctive research domain: Do nonhuman animals,
in fact, appreciate that others have unobservable mental states that modulate
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their behavior? Or are we the only species which understands that others have
minds of their own?
Theory of Mind in Animals: Putting It into Perspective
Why is this splitting of hairs important and how can we move forward? It
might seem anthropocentric to deny mental state attribution or theory of mind
(in the narrow sense) to animals other than humans. However, there are a number of reasons for continuing to challenge the evidence used in favor of theory
of mind. First, it is often wondered what, if anything, mental state attributions
would allow a social animal to do that other processes cannot do. To be fair,
when asking the question of how theory of mind evolved in humans, it does
seem reasonable to look for homologs in other species. Different answers to
this question suggest various potential avenues for future research. For example, the social intelligence hypothesis, especially in its Machiavellian guises
(Humphrey 1978; Byrne and Whiten 1991), suggested that the attribution of
belief evolved in humans to make better predictions of behavior as well as
to deceive competitors more effectively, and inspired research into theory of
mind (particularly false belief attribution).
Today, almost all comparative psychologists agree that social vertebrates
are quite adept at predicting the observable behavior of other animals, including how conspecifics are likely to behave given those specific individuals’ past
behavior as well as the behavior of other conspecifics under similar circumstances. For humans, predictions of behavior can be made using a number
of different mechanisms. One can use behavioral rules (Povinelli and Vonk
2004; Penn and Povinelli 2007b; Perner and Roessler 2010; Andrews 2005)
that generalize over the target individual’s past behavior, or the past behavior of other individuals. One can use group norms (Maibom 2007; Andrews
2009; Perner and Roessler 2010) to predict that others will do what they should
do. One can also appeal to unobservables such as personality traits, emotions,
and sensations as well as propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires
(Andrews 2011). (Note that associative learning could play some role in any of
these ways of predicting behavior.) Attempts to determine how animals predict
behavior has tended to pit behavioral rules (learning) against mental state understanding (propositional attitudes). This is a false dichotomy, and pluralism
suggests that additional hypotheses should be considered.
It seems clear that nonhuman animals form concrete representations of the
behavior of particular conspecifics as well as abstract representations of the
statistical regularities in general classes of behaviors. It also seems clear that
the sophistication and flexibility of nonhuman social cognition goes far beyond
the limits of purely associative learning and employs what might be properly
called “inferential” mechanisms and relational representations (Penn et al.
2008). One well-documented example of such inferential reasoning is the ability to make inductive generalizations on the basis of the social relation between
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conspecifics (see, e.g., Bergman et al. 2003; Seyfarth and Cheney 2003c).
Indeed, the ability to reason about transitive social relationships appears to
be fairly widespread in the animal kingdom (Otter et al. 1999; Grosenick and
Clement 2007). Thus, the important question for future research in the “theory
of mind” domain is not whether animals are capable of reasoning about others’
social relationships and behavior (they are) but whether, in addition, animals
are capable of reasoning about others’ unobservable mental states and, if so,
what kind, when, how, and why.
Over ten years ago, Heyes (1998) complained that comparative psychology
had made little progress in answering this question, and it is far from clear
whether much progress has been made since then (Penn and Povinelli 2007b).
One source of difficulty today is that it is rarely clear what researchers are actually claiming when they employ folk psychological terms: “chimpanzees know
what others do and do not know.” For example, does claiming that one animal
“knows” what another animal “knows” mean that the subject represents and
reasons about how the other agent is likely to act given the other agent’s past
behavior and the state of the world? Or does it mean that the subject represents
the other agent’s representation of a particular state of the world? How exactly
would one tease apart this difference empirically?
The same confusion plagues terms like “intentions,” “perceptions,” and
even “perspective-taking.” For some psychologists, evidence that animals reason about how others typically act toward objects or what others see is taken
as evidence that they understand others’ “intentions” and “perceptions” as psychological states (Tomasello et al. 2003a, b). For other researchers, this is only
evidence that those animals can reason about others’ behavioral dispositions
(Povinelli and Vonk 2003). The problem with “visual perspective-taking” is
twofold: one needs to distinguish between Level 1 (being able to look at some
object or scene or not being able to do so) and Level 2 (seeing different things
when looking at the same thing or scene; Masangkay et al. 1974), and have the
ability to switch between perspectives and understand that there are two perspectives involved (Perner et al. 2002). We do think that “perspective,” when
properly defined, captures the central aspect of “meta-representation” which, in
our view, is required for understanding false beliefs. However, another source
of difficulty in studying theory of mind may be due to false presuppositions
about its adaptive value and ubiquity in human social interactions. Addressing
these concerns may lead to more productive future research.
Looking Ahead
In contrast to the claim that the adaptive value of theory of mind is to increase
the ability to predict behavior, some might speculate that adaptive value and
propositional attitude attributions are to promote social cohesion by allowing
individuals to explain, justify, and evaluate abnormal or unexpected behavior (Andrews 2009; Perner 2011). For instance, when an individual witnesses
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something unusual, say crippling polio in chimpanzees or lack of cooperation,
does it seek more information to determine the underlying social causes for
atypical behaviors? Further experiments along this line will be interesting, because theory of mind could allow individuals to more subtly infer failures on
the parts of their partners, to recognize innovations such as new tools, and to
intentionally teach others.
In this context, we discussed an experimental paradigm that involved training a dominant and subordinate chimpanzee to work together according to a
certain rule in order to acquire a preferred food. The rule was then changed,
but only the dominant was informed of the change. Further, the dominant was
given the opportunity to learn that the subordinate was working with a different rule. The prediction is that if the dominant understood that the subordinates’ incorrect behavior was due to a different informational state, the dominant should not behave antagonistically toward the subordinate who would not
engage in the behavior necessary for gaining food. However, if the dominant
did not understand why the subordinate violated the rule, then, since the violation results in the dominant not gaining food, we would expect the dominant
to behave antagonistically toward the subordinate. Experiments such as this
are based on the view that attributions of beliefs have been adaptive for the
development of social norms.
In this discussion of the mechanisms that may underlie the ability to predict
and explain another’s behavior in terms of mental states (i.e., theory of mind),
we did not discuss a related mechanism based on introspection. Humphrey was
one of the first to suggest that “mind reading” has to be based on the ability
to model another’s inner states (thoughts and feelings) based on one’s own inner states in the same context (Humphrey 1980). This last point is perhaps the
most important as it forms the basis for “putting yourself in another’s shoes.”
Whether or not this method of predicting behavior involves some form of introspection (Gordon 1995, e.g., argues that it does not), it can only be adaptive if
it is based on using, remembering, or “generating” (imaginative identification)
previous experiences in the same or similar situation to the agent whose mental
states you are modeling. There seems to be great potential for using this model
to test whether nonhuman animals are reliant on reading external behavioral
cues to understand anything about another’s mental states. Determining what
additional causal work reading minds adds over reading behavior alone is one
of the most contentious issues in comparative cognition (Penn and Povinelli
2007b; Penn, this volume; Perner 2011). Hence, focusing on simulation tests
may be an empirical means for getting past the behavior-reading–mind-reading trap (see also Lurz 2010).
In her criticism of theory of mind research in animals, Heyes suggested that
a task based on introspection could provide clear evidence for mind reading
(Heyes 1998; Penn and Povinelli 2007b). The idea is to provide an animal
(e.g., a chimpanzee) with a novel first-person experience; namely goggles, one
of which is translucent, allowing the wearer to see, and the other which is
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opaque. The only way to tell the goggles apart is by an arbitrary feature, such
as the color of the frames. Without any behavioral cues from the wearers, but
from his own experience, the animal should be able to predict that another
individual wearing the opaque goggles (say, red frames) will not be able to
see, whereas the one wearing the translucent goggles (yellow frames) will.
In the case of chimpanzees, individuals should beg from experimenters wearing goggles with yellow frames and not from those with red-framed goggles.
This task was proposed in response to a study in which chimpanzees had to
beg from an experimenter who had a bucket on her shoulders versus one who
covered her head with a bucket (Povinelli and Eddy 1996). Chimpanzees in
this study failed, but Heyes’ (1998) concern was that even if they had passed,
this may have been due to prior experience in begging from people with visible eyes. The goggles task proposed by Heyes (1998) has yet to be performed
in animals but has recently been tested in young children (Teufel et al. 2011;
Senju et al. 2011). The only empirical evidence (we are aware of) related to this
issue is that of experience projection in scrub jays. These food-caching corvids cache food for later consumption and protect their caches from thieving
conspecifics by hiding them in places they cannot see or moving them to new
places once a potential thief has left the vicinity (Clayton et al. 2007). What is
of interest to the current discussion is the fact that only jays with the specific
experience of stealing another’s caches utilize the cache protection strategy
of moving caches (re-caching) to a new location in private (i.e., unknown to
the previously observing jay). This re-caching behavior is not seen in jays of
the same age that were not given this thieving experience, even though they
had experienced their own caches being stolen. Emery and Clayton suggest
that the cachers “reflected” on their previous experience of being a thief and
used this experience to model a potential thief’s future intention to steal and,
as such, move caches to a new location to protect them (Emery and Clayton
2001). Although a reasonable assumption, especially when taken together with
the other cache protection strategies demonstrated by these birds, the issue of
what psychological mechanisms may underlie this behavior continues to be the
subject of much debate (Penn, this volume; Shettleworth 2010b).
An example of how we might demonstrate visual perspective-taking would
be to use a naturally occurring behavior, such as food-caching in scrub jays.
The experimental design follows the suggestion of Heyes (1998) described
above: scrub jays can be given experience with two peepholes that allows
them to see into an adjacent cage. They would also have experience that one
peephole allows the competitor to see while the other does not, and have a
blind they can draw to block the peephole. When caching, the bird should
draw the blind down only if there is a competitor in the cage with the seeing
peephole, blocking his visual access. If this happens in the absence of any behavioral cues or past experience, then it is plausible that there is a perceptual
state attribution, though it would not offer evidence of a belief state attribution.
However, one always needs first-person experience to find out what something
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is, whether it is yellow, green, hard, or soft. The same holds for transparent
versus opaque. Once it has been established that one peephole is transparent
and the other opaque, then one need not ascribe a mental state of “seeing” to
the other individual. All that is needed is an understanding that the transparent
hole needs to be blocked to prevent the other from intervening. In short, even
with a clever paradigm such as this, it is hard to know what can be learned
about perceptual state attribution.
One might ask whether it is possible to make any progress on the theory
of mind question. Many comparative researchers bemoan the attention that
theory of mind has already attracted and argue that further investment would
be ill-spent. It may be more productive to focus on understanding the particular
mechanisms employed by particular species in their species-typical forms of
social interaction rather than in making a list of nonhuman animals’ inadequacies relative to a human benchmark. A final concern is that it might not ever be
possible to demonstrate this in nonlinguistic species, and that research efforts
would better be directed toward more ecologically grounded pursuits.
On a positive note, the point was raised that the theory of mind approach is,
in fact, a productive research paradigm that has led to the discovery of many
new phenomena, whereas a “behavior rule” approach just produces post-hoc
explanations of these phenomena. The question of whether nonhuman animals
have human-like mentalizing abilities or tendencies makes researchers look at
and try to tease out aspects of animal behavior they would not otherwise detect.
However, it is a legitimate post-hoc question to ask to what degree these newly
discovered aspects are the product of a theory of mind or the product of picking
up mind-relevant behaviors in conjunction with behavior rules. For instance, a
high sensitivity to behavior in relation to locations of desirable objects attests
to the fact that animals understand something about the mind, even though they
may not have theory of mind in the narrow sense (Perner 2010). However, being a driving force in discovering new phenomena is one thing; overinterpreting these discoveries is another.
Feeling into Others: Social Concerns
Like theory of mind, emotions are difficult to define without appealing to folk
psychological terms. The issue here is not how we can assess the emotional
experience of animals, but whether animals are able to do this with each other.
Of particular interest to social knowledge are social concerns (also called fortunes-of-others emotions; Ortony et al. 1988).
Social concerns can either be aligned with the emotions and welfare of others, or misaligned. When aligned, the emotions of the subject match those of
another individual, so that if the other individual is happy (or in happy circumstances), the subject is happy (symhedonia); if the other individual is sad (or
in unfortunate circumstances), the subject is sad (empathy). Aligned emotions
are positive social concerns, and it is easy to see how they can be important
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sources of social knowledge (for reviews, see Silk 2007b, 2009; Jensen 2011).
Empathy and symhedonia should motivate prosocial behavior such as comforting, sharing, and helping. It should be noted that empathy is more than
just emotional contagion, which is the automatic “catching” of emotions from
another individual’s expressions (Hatfield et al. 1994). Empathy requires affective perspective-taking, resulting in having emotions appropriate to the
circumstances of another individual (e.g., Hoffman 1982). This is similar to
the earlier argument for theory of mind in that affective perspective-taking,
such as empathy, requires imputing the unobservable, not simply mirroring a
behavior. Some researchers (de Waal and van Roosmalen 1979; Preston and
de Waal 2002) defend the notion of empathy in animals, particularly chimpanzees. Their evidence comes largely from anecdotes, but also from observations
of consolation and experiments in food provisioning. Anecdotal observations
are notoriously difficult to interpret. As for consolation (i.e., providing comfort to another individual, such as after a conflict with a third party), this has
been taken as being motivated by empathy. However, “consolation” may be
directed at reducing the consoler’s stress, rather than the target’s, and it may
serve the functional benefit of reducing the likelihood of redirected aggression
(Koski and Sterck 2007, 2009). Consolation, then, may be motivated out of
self-comfort (or self-protection), rather than out of a concern for the well-being
of the recipient. Emotional contagion would produce this effect because seeing
the distress of another individual would cause distress in the observers, and
prompt them to seek comfort for themselves.
Affective perspective-taking, like simulation discussed earlier, involves inferences about the emotional state of others, and it can do so in the absence
of emotional cues (Eisenberg et al. 1991; Hoffman 1984). This has been demonstrated in children by presenting a distressing scenario without any signs of
distress in the target (Vaish et al. 2009). However, as yet, there is no evidence
that, in the absence of emotional signals (but in the presence of an emotional
event), animals show affective perspective-taking. This issue warrants future
investigation. As for the motivations behind prosocial acts, it is difficult to
determine whether empathy is the driving force, as has been suggested by de
Waal et al. (2008), or whether something like empathy beyond emotional contagion is at work (Koski and Sterck 2010). The evidence for prosocial acts, in
the absence of requests or distress signals, is rather uncommon in primates,
the most extensively studied species so far. Chimpanzees, for instance, seem
indifferent to outcomes affecting others, failing to give them food even at no
real personal cost (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006; Vonk et al. 2008), yet
they will help them achieve goals when the signal is clear (Warneken and
Tomasello 2006; Yamamoto et al. 2009; Melis et al. 2010). Socially tolerant
cooperative breeders, such as common marmosets have been suggested as being more inclined to provide food for conspecifics in the absence of signaling
(Burkart et al. 2007), but here, too, results are mixed (Cronin et al. 2010, 2009;
Stevens 2010a).
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Misaligned emotions occur when the emotional state of the subject is inconsistent with the target’s welfare and emotions. Envy (unhappiness at the good
fortunes of others) and schadenfreude (pleasure in the misfortunes of others)
are examples of negative social concerns. While not likely to lead to prosocial
acts, they are valuable sources of social knowledge, allowing individuals to
gauge their outcomes relative to others and to be more motivated to compete
with rivals, and to do so in a more sophisticated manner. For instance, they
may motivate punishment and or spiteful behaviors, the former of which are
adaptive by deterring uncooperative behavior, for instance (Clutton-Brock and
Parker 1995). Spitefulness is less intuitively adaptive, but may benefit the actor indirectly by preventing others from being better off (Jensen 2010). What
needs to be determined is whether animals are motivated by their own immediate (or possibly) delayed outcomes, or whether they also have the suffering of
others as goals. One area where negative social concerns have been suggested
to manifest themselves is in disadvantageous inequity aversion. Sensitivity to
fairness—being upset at having less than others is the minimal case—has been
suggested as an essential component to uniquely human cooperation (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003), hence the interest in this topic. The typical approach to
studying disadvantageous inequity aversion, as pioneered by Brosnan and de
Waal (2003), involves one animal handing an object it just received back to the
experimenter in exchange for a piece of food. The general idea—sometimes
replicated, sometimes not—is that the subject is less likely to engage in the
game if the partner receives a better quality piece of food, particularly if the
partner does no work (i.e., exchange an object). If animals are averse to disadvantageous inequity, one would expect them to behave spitefully, to respond to
the unfair outcome, and to any unfair intention, by causing their better-off rival
to experience a loss. The ultimatum game is a widely used tool used by economists to probe fairness preferences (Güth et al. 1982). One person (proposer)
is given an endowment (money) which he can then share with another person.
The second person (responder) can refuse the offer of the proposer, causing
both individuals to gain nothing; acceptance results in both getting the proposed division. Contrary to economic predictions based on rational decision
making, responders reject offers perceived as unfair and, as a result, proposers
tend to make fair divisions. Emotions appear to play a result in the decision
to reject unfair offers, even at a cost; unfair offers are met with anger (Knoch
et al. 2006; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996). On the other hand, chimpanzees,
the only animal tested thus far, do not reject unfair offers in a mini-ultimatum
game (Jensen et al. 2007a), despite being angry in another paradigm in which
their food is taken away by a conspecific (Jensen et al. 2007b). At present, it is
difficult to say whether animals have negative social concerns, taking the suffering of others into account.
Although motivational states are known to affect social decision making
in animals ranging from honey bees to humans, the role of emotion in social
cognition remains a rich area for future exploration. Another promising area
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for future work at the interface between social decision making and brain function will address questions regarding how social information is transduced into
cellular and molecular change in the brain, and which genes are involved in
the mediation of social behavior. At present, research linking genes, brain, and
social behavior is at its early stages (Fischer and Hammerschmidt 2011).

How Do We Study Social Cognition?
A point that becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that there is no
easy way to get into the heads of other animals. Trying to understand what
animals do and do not know about their social worlds, and the specific processes they use to solve their adaptive challenges, is a great challenge. In our
discussions, we considered three broad paths that researchers can take: computational models, observational studies, and experiments.
Computational Models
Computational modeling allows us to control variables selectively and observe
their effects, and illustrates how relatively simple processes can produce complex outcomes. Agent-based models are particularly attractive for behavioral
research.
One example of an agent-based model is GroofiWorld, which is based on
the social behavior of primates (Hemelrijk, this volume). In GroofiWorld, when
agents “meet,” they may “attack” the other, “groom” it, or do nothing. The
model appears to reproduce many of the grooming patterns of real primates
without assuming the cognitive processes usually assumed. For example, in
the model the agents reciprocated grooming and reconciled fights, especially
with valued partners as well as in egalitarian rather than despotic societies.
Reciprocation in the model emerges because individuals have more opportunities to groom some than others. Reconciliation is statistically found in the
model because former opponents are, on average, closer together after a fight
than they are otherwise. Thus they have more opportunities to groom a former
opponent (called reconciliation) immediately after a fight, than at other times.
Thus, “reconciliation” may be in the eye of the beholder: what we observe to
be “reconciliation” need not involve an underlying “conciliatory tendency.”
In a similar way, “preferred reconciliation” with “valuable partners” emerges
in the model without an understanding of social relationships; it emerges as a
side effect of rank, because individuals in the model groom and reconcile more
often with partners that are higher in rank. The model also produces a higher
conciliatory tendency in egalitarian societies, because subordinates initiate interactions more often than they do in a despotic society and subordinates (compared to dominants) groom others more often. Consequently, the percentage of
time spent grooming as well as the frequency of grooming immediately after
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a fight (i.e., the conciliatory tendency) is higher in egalitarian than in despotic
societies.
One insight is that simple behavioral rules can produce behaviors that appear complex to outside observers. Reconciliatory behavior may not require
an understanding of social relationships, prosocial motivations, or anything of
the sort. All that may be required is risk-sensitive aggression, grooming that
reduces tension, a tendency to groom if defeat is expected, and the spatial positions of individuals.
Computational models generate an abundance of hypotheses for future investigations. The GroofiWorld model points to the importance of studying the
spatial positioning of individuals in a group and their relation to dominance
and grooming behavior. For example, there is less reconciliation in despotic
species, such as Rheusus macaques (Macaca mulatta), than in more egalitarian
species such as Tonkean macaques (M. tonkeana). This difference can be fully
explained by a different spatial structure in both species.
Care is advised in how strongly one interprets findings from models like
these. Just because a simple rule can explain the behavior of agents in a model
does not mean that only simple rules actually apply (simple rules may also be
applied only in a certain percentage of cases), or that all animals use the same
rules. Mice might solve conflicts based solely on proximity rules, whereas
monkeys might use an understanding of social relationships, while humans
will apply norms of social conduct. The behavioral outcome might be the same
in each case, but the processes governing the behaviors may be very different.
For computational models to advance research into social cognition, they
must reflect the real world. In other words, the variables in the model have to
be valid. In addition, models must make predictions which can later be confirmed. The DomWorld model (predecessor to GroofiWorld) satisfied these criteria. It predicted that female dominance over males was higher when aggression was fiercer and when males constituted a higher percentage in the group.
Both predictions were first derived from the model and subsequently tested and
confirmed with empirical data. Perhaps more importantly, some variables must
be shown to work less effectively than others. For instance, in GroofiWorld,
it made no difference whether dominance interactions had self-reinforcing effects or not; resemblance to grooming patterns of primates largely vanished
when agents chose interaction partners at random instead of interacting with
those that they met close by (thus, when the spatial effects were excluded). It
is sometimes suspected that many variables and many models will produce the
same, or superficially similar, outcomes (see Hemelrijk, this volume).
Observational Studies
The best way to determine the validity of computational models is to see what
animals actually do. Ideally, this should be done in the natural habitat using
several groups of animals for as diverse a range of taxa as possible. The idea
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is to build up a portrait of the behavioral repertoire. Reports of behavior of
animals in the wild continue to yield surprises and insights. Observational
studies from the field have revealed a fascinating array of behaviors, some
very complex (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990a, 2007). For instance, spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta) often recruit conspecifics from several kilometers away
with loud vocalizations (Figure 18.1); once a sufficient number of group-mates
has arrived, they solicit help to mob and displace lions (Panthera leo) from a
carcass (Figure 18.2). How hyenas assess relative group size and probability
of success, how they interpret and decide to respond to recruiting signals, and
how they decide with whom to form mobbing coalitions are open questions.
As hyena societies are structured exactly like troops of cercopithecine primates
(Holekamp 2007), priority of access to food is determined by social rank once
the hyenas gain possession of the carcass from lions. Therefore, division of
the spoils is never equitable among the coalition partners who mobbed and
displaced the lions. This raises the question of why low-ranking hyenas cooperate in dangerous mobbing of lions if their expected rewards will be small or
nil. In her chapter in this volume, Cheney suggests that monkeys might make
decisions regarding whether or not to help conspecifics contingent upon earlier
or anticipated behavior of group-mates, perhaps mediated by some form of
long-term “emotional book-keeping.” Field studies are needed, however, to
determine whether a mechanism like this might be operating among gregarious animals.
In another example, giant moray eels (Gymnothorax javanicus) and grouper fish (Plectropomus pessuliferus) were observed to hunt in a coordinated,

Figure 18.1

Spotted hyenas join forces to mob a lion (photo by Stephanie M. Dloniak).
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cooperative fashion reminiscent of chimpanzee hunting (Bshary et al. 2006),
which raises provocative questions about the cognitive abilities used by animals. The key conclusion from the grouper-moray study is that we cannot use
observations to infer the cognitive processes underlying the behavior, something that field researchers are, quite understandably, inclined to do at times,
particularly when working with species that more closely resemble humans.
The old idea that behaviors or patterns uniquely described in primates/chimps/
humans indicate complex cognitive processes has been shattered by many
studies in other taxa.
Unfortunately, field observations can obfuscate research into social cognition. Although their strength lies in describing behavioral phenomena and their
adaptive functions, field observations are more opaque when it comes to inferring mental states. For example, chimpanzee hunting and border patrols have
been held up as examples of a fairly sophisticated cognitive process called
joint intentionality (Boesch 2005). However, coordinated behavior does not
require joint intentionality; individual agents pursuing their own goals simultaneously do not have to have the goals of others in mind (Tomasello et al. 2005).
Distinguishing between the two processes can only be done experimentally.
When making observations, having an open mind without preconceptions
is essential, but it also helps to have expectations about what is to be observed.
It may be useful to ask anthropocentric questions such as: Does the chimp intentionally deceive his opponent? Does he understand that the opponent knows
where the food is? This approach goes awry, however, when the human (folk
psychological) interpretation of such behavior is viewed as the only obvious
and viable interpretation. Initial exploratory anthropocentric expectations need
to be verified through cognitive analysis (Perner 2010). Is attribution of every
element in this analysis supported by the observed behavior?

Figure 18.2 Collective action by spotted hyenas allows them to maintain possession
of a giraffe carcass also sought by a large subadult male lion (photo by Kay Holekamp).
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Experiments
Ultimately, the best way to assess the cognitive processes of animals is to use
experiments, both in the laboratory and in the field. Laboratory experiments
are more prone to problems of ecological validity, whereas field experiments
are more likely to suffer from problems of lack of control. A basic disconnect
between the two appears to be far greater in the study of social cognition than
in the study of other cognitive processes (e.g., navigation). Optimally, both
approaches are needed when studying a particular species, but this is done less
often than one would hope. In addition, if we want to understand the adaptive
value of any particular aspect of social cognition, this can only be addressed
in the field.
Playback experiments on free-ranging baboons have revealed that animals
recognize the close associates, dominance ranks, and transient consort relationships of other individuals (reviewed by Cheney and Seyfarth 2007) and
that they make use of this knowledge in their social interactions. For example,
when a female baboon hears her opponent’s “reconciliatory” grunt shortly after being threatened, she is more likely to approach her opponent and to tolerate her opponent’s approach than after hearing no grunt or hearing the grunt
of another female unrelated to her opponent (Cheney and Seyfarth 1997). In
other playback experiments, Wittig et al. (2007) demonstrated that baboons
also accept the grunt of a close relative of a recent opponent as a proxy for
direct reconciliation with the opponent herself. After hearing the grunt of one
of their opponent’s close relatives, subjects were more likely to come into close
proximity of their opponent. By contrast, hearing the grunt of a female from a
different matriline had no effect on subjects’ behavior.
These results suggest that baboons take into account a variety of information when deciding how to respond to a vocalization, including the identity of
the caller, call type, the nature of recent interactions, and the relation between
the caller and other recent partners or opponents. In the case of kin-mediated
reconciliation, baboons seem to recognize that a grunt by the relative of an opponent serves the same function as a grunt by the opponent herself.

Ways Forward
A Question of Questions
There are a number of reasons to study the cognitive processes and the abilities of nonhuman animals. Our attempts to understand the processes used by
animals to solve their everyday problems help us understand the evolution
of such behaviors. When we see lions hunt and hyenas amass to usurp their
kill, comparative psychologists and others cannot help but wonder what an
animal is “thinking” or how it “knows” how to achieve its goals (though behavioral ecologists might remain agnostic on these topics). Folk psychology
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may inspire our pursuit, but we must remain guarded against unbridled anthropomorphism. At the most fundamental level, we need more field studies asking
what animals “know” about their social worlds, and we need to learn much
more about multiple aspects of social cognition in a broader array of species
than has been studied to date. Only once we understand what animals know in
nature will we be able to ask how they acquire and use this knowledge to make
adaptive decisions.
We are also interested in animals for what they can tell us about how humans solve their social problems. This is the reason for the theory of mind
research “industry,” just as it was the basis of comparative psychology when it
was called behaviorism prior to present-day neuroscience. Understanding the
brains of animals helps us understand human brains; discovering the processes
animals use for addressing their social problems, which have parallels with our
own, can illuminate the processes we use. In addition, while this is not likely
to be a popular view, seeing how difficult it is for animals to solve social problems can impress us with what might otherwise seem to be mundane cognitive
feats, such as understanding that a cup at which someone is pointing contains
food. On the other hand, seeing how easy it is for animals to solve other social
problems may lead us to realize that humans may be using simpler cognitive
mechanisms than previously assumed. Some very exciting work on animal
cognition is done in parallel with developmental psychology (e.g., Krachun
and Call 2009). Both young children and animals can be tested with paradigms
that do not rely on language. This allows us to see behaviors that are not manifestly fully formed (and culturally biased), as they are in human adults.
The Future of Social Cognition
In an ideal world, one useful approach would be to compare multiple species
using the same or similar methods used by teams of researchers. Consortiumlevel experiments have been very fruitfully applied by Joseph Henrich and others in comparing economic game theory in human cultures around the world.
Similar approaches, informed by phylogenetic relatedness, are being used to
choose the species most appropriate to test specific questions, such as temperament. In this way, rather than piecemeal collections of papers using different
methods on few species of variable phylogenetic relatedness, researchers could
begin to construct phylogenies of cognitive traits and relate these to ecological
factors. While a monumental and challenging enterprise, it would be desirable
to see work of this type.
Related to the use of phylogenetically corrected methods for interspecific
comparisons of social cognition will be the use of these methods to inquire
about the evolutionary history of specific cognitive abilities in animals, as well
as the selection pressures that shape them. In the same way that Basolo (1990,
1996) was able to demonstrate that female preferences for long tails among
swordtail fish evolved before the long tails themselves, study of a wider range
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of species should allow us to infer the evolutionary pathways through which
specific cognitive abilities developed. To date, the majority of work on social
cognition has been conducted with primates, and a number of specific abilities
in the domain of social cognition were long thought to be unique to primates,
including, for example, transitive inference. Recent work has, however, shown
that this ability is also present in nonprimate mammals, birds, and fish (Engh
et al. 2006; Grosenick and Clement 2007), suggesting either that its mediating
mechanisms in the nervous system are very old or that this ability evolved convergently multiple times in response to a common suite of selection pressures.
Another approach is to integrate research methodologies. Having more information on the possible role of neurological mechanisms using noninvasive
data recording and imaging techniques will allow us to infer more about the
possible cognitive processes that are involved. Physiological data (e.g., heart
rate and hormones) will add depth to questions such as the role of stress in
grooming and reconciliation. If these can be experimentally manipulated, such
as by administering oxytocin to see if it has an effect on prosocial preferences
in other animals as it does in humans, then we will be able to say more about
the role of emotional and executive processes, and the evolutionary implications of these.
In addition, modeling results need to be integrated as hypotheses for empirical data from free-living animals and for experimental procedures with captive
ones. Models based on self-organization are particularly useful, because their
results are close to natural observations (usually the same observation units
and statistical methods are used in the model as in empirical studies). These
models are usually based on simple behavioral rules known to exist in animals
(e.g., grouping behavior, the calming effect of grooming) and thus can be used
by scientists to become acquainted with the consequences of simple behavioral rules for patterns of social behavior and for types of social organization.
By integrating effects of space, these models generate hypotheses which we
cannot think of without these models; it appears that our mind is more prone
to thinking intentionally than to integrating spatial constraints on behavioral
interactions. Therefore, social-spatial structure must be investigated on a large
scale in many species.
Over forty years ago, talk of animal cognition was taboo. Since then, it has
been slow to gain traction as a respected research discipline (see Griffin 1984).
Students of animal behavior were once taught that there was no possible way
to peer inside the black box, nor was there any value in looking. This was the
one—and possibly only—thing upon which ethologists, behavioral ecologists,
and behaviorists could all agree.
Now, however, based on a cornucopia of impressive discoveries of the cognitive abilities of animals, new insights are available which, in turn, generates
more questions and will hopefully lead to further discoveries. Although it is
not possible to predict where the field will progress over the next ten years, we
see great potential in future research endeavors.
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